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District Court 14 August 2026

R v Baysari

[2026] NSWDC 299

Assault & violenceFirearms & weapons
CRIME JUDGE ALONE TRIAL VERDICT FIRE FIREARM AT A DWELLING

Citation: R v Baysari [2026] NSWDC 299
Court: District Court of New South Wales
Date: 14 August 2026
Judge(s): Bourke SC DCJ

Background

The accused faced two alternative charges arising from an incident on the night of 20 June 2022 at a house in Kelso, New South Wales. The Crown alleged that the accused knocked on the front door of a residential property and then fired a pistol at it.

Count 1 charged discharging a firearm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. Count 2, framed as an alternative, charged firing a firearm at a dwelling-house with reckless disregard for the safety of another person.

The trial proceeded before a judge alone, by agreement of the accused and the Crown. The accused pleaded not guilty to both counts. The central dispute was not whether a firearm had been discharged at the premises, which both parties accepted, but whether the accused was the person who fired it. The Crown relied entirely on circumstantial evidence.

  • Whether the Crown proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was the person who discharged the firearm at the premises
  • Whether the Crown's circumstantial case, considered as a whole, excluded all rational inferences inconsistent with guilt
  • Whether the elements of Count 1 (intent to cause grievous bodily harm) were established, and if not, whether Count 2 (reckless disregard for safety) was nevertheless made out

Decision

Issue 1: Identity of the shooter

The sole contested issue was identity. The accused did not dispute that a firearm was discharged at 51 Bannerman Crescent, Kelso, or that the premises constituted a dwelling-house, or that the act was done with reckless disregard for the safety of persons inside. His denial went only to whether he was the shooter.

Issue 2: Sufficiency of the circumstantial case

Bourke SC DCJ acknowledged that the Crown presented a well-crafted circumstantial case and that the combined circumstances made it "very probable" the accused was the shooter. However, probability does not satisfy the criminal standard. The court is required to find guilt only if the inference of guilt is the sole rational inference available.

Issue 3: Reasonable doubt on the totality of the evidence

The court identified eight primary arguments raised by the accused and three additional matters it considered independently. These included: the absence of CCTV footage identifying the accused at the scene; inconclusive DNA evidence linking him to the vehicles involved; no forensic link between the accused and the pistol or the premises where it was found; no communications evidence (such as text messages) suggesting involvement; and the absence of evidence placing other persons with DNA connections to the relevant vehicles at a different location on the night. Taken together, these gaps in the Crown case left the court with a reasonable doubt. Both counts accordingly returned verdicts of not guilty.

Orders Made

• Not guilty verdict on each charge

Key Takeaways

  • In a circumstantial case, a finding of guilt requires that guilt be the only rational inference available from the proven facts; a conclusion that an accused "very probably" committed the offence does not satisfy the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt.
  • Where alternative counts are charged, a judge sitting alone must not compromise between them: the primary count must be assessed on its own merits first, and the alternative considered only if a reasonable doubt remains on the primary count.
  • Gaps in the Crown's circumstantial case, including the absence of forensic links, communications evidence, and evidence excluding other possible perpetrators, can collectively generate reasonable doubt even where the overall case appears compelling.
  • The District Court confirmed that the combined weight of circumstantial evidence must be assessed as a whole, consistent with the approach endorsed in Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397, but that individual strands of doubt, viewed in combination, may still produce an acquittal.
  • Reasonable doubt remained despite the Crown's case being described as logically constructed and persuasively presented, illustrating that the cogency of a closing address does not remedy evidentiary gaps on identity.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation
- Not stated

Cases
- Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397