LF v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2026] NSWSC 212

Citation: LF v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2026] NSWSC 212
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 4 March 2026
Judge(s): Hamill J

Background

This was a release application under the Bail Act 2013 (NSW) brought by LF, a 14-year-old boy facing charges across ten separate Court Attendance Notices. The alleged offending spanned from August 2025 to January 2026 and involved a pattern of violence, intimidation, property damage, and stealing offences. Many of the offences were committed while LF was already subject to bail conditions and Apprehended Domestic Violence Orders. Several of the victims were members of LF's own family — most notably his mother, who was the victim of multiple assaults and intimidation offences. Other offences involved threats to police, an assault on peers (including a stabbing with a pen), and intimidation of suspected witnesses.

LF had pleaded guilty to some of the charges and was due to be sentenced in the Children's Court the day after the bail hearing. However, a number of other charges remained defended, and the contested hearings were not expected to be reached until mid-2026. LF had been in Youth Justice detention since 23 January 2026. The evidence before the court included Youth Justice reports indicating significant childhood trauma, preliminary diagnoses of neurological conditions, and — more recently — positive progress in custody, including expressions of remorse and exemplary behaviour as a detainee. LF's mother remained supportive despite being a victim of several of his offences.

The Director of Public Prosecutions opposed bail, submitting that a control order (the Children's Court equivalent of a custodial sentence) was the most likely sentencing outcome given the nature, frequency, and seriousness of LF's offending.

Legal Issues

Whether the bail concerns arising from LF's extensive and violent offending history could be sufficiently mitigated by bail conditions, having regard to the factors in s 18 of the Bail Act 2013 (NSW).
Whether granting bail on the eve of sentencing proceedings would impermissibly "fetter" the Children's Court Magistrate's sentencing discretion — and, conversely, whether refusing bail might equally fetter that discretion.
How the court should weigh the likelihood of a custodial sentence (a mandatory consideration under s 18(1)(i)) without treating that factor as determinative.
The relevance of anticipated delay in the resolution of defended charges (s 18(1)(h)), where a 14-year-old faced the prospect of remaining in custody until mid-2026 on unresolved matters.
Whether previous bail conditions (particularly those resembling home detention) had been counterproductive, and what conditions might better manage risk.

Decision

Hamill J described the application as "one of the more confronting and difficult applications" he had dealt with in over a decade on the Bail Court. His Honour reviewed the ten sets of offences in detail, noting the troubling pattern of LF resorting to violence when frustrated, angry, or provoked — including violence directed at his own mother, other young people, and police.

Against this, the court acknowledged LF's deeply traumatic childhood, his preliminary neurological diagnoses, and — critically — the most recent Youth Justice report, which documented positive progress in custody: LF had expressed shame for his behaviour, demonstrated insight into its impact, and had been an exemplary detainee since late January 2026. His NDIS support was also noted as a potentially stabilising factor.

On the "fettering" question, Hamill J engaged in a careful analysis of the distinct roles of the bail court and the sentencing court. His Honour emphasised that a bail court applies the specific provisions of the Bail Act and assesses risk by reference to the s 18 factors — it does not exercise the sentencing discretion. A grant of bail would not predetermine whether a control order should be imposed; the Magistrate would remain free to impose a custodial sentence regardless. But his Honour also observed that the converse was true: refusing bail could equally create an appearance of predetermining the sentencing outcome. His Honour directed that the ex tempore remarks be made available to the Children's Court Magistrate to make clear that the bail decision carried no implications for sentencing.

On the question of delay, Hamill J expressed surprise that a defended hearing in the Children's Court could be delayed until June or July 2026 but accepted the information provided by LF's counsel. His Honour observed that it was "an extraordinarily long time for a child of 14 to enjoy the presumption of innocence while being locked up," and took this into account under s 18(1)(h).

Ultimately, Hamill J was persuaded that the positive trajectory evidenced in the most recent Youth Justice report, combined with LF's mother's continued support, meant that the bail concerns could be mitigated by appropriate conditions. Notably, his Honour found that the previous bail conditions — which had effectively amounted to home detention — had been counterproductive, as the enforced close proximity between LF and his mother appeared to have contributed to frustration and violence. A curfew was imposed instead, with ongoing supervision largely left to Youth Justice.

Orders Made

Bail was granted subject to conditions.
Conditions included a curfew (rather than home detention) and supervision by Youth Justice.
The specific bail conditions were set out in a separate document (not reproduced in the published judgment).
Hamill J directed that his ex tempore remarks be provided to the Children's Court Magistrate for the sentencing hearing the following day, to make clear that the bail decision did not fetter the sentencing discretion.

Key Takeaways

Bail and sentencing are distinct exercises: The Supreme Court reinforced that a bail court's function is to assess risk under s 18 of the Bail Act 2013 (NSW), not to predetermine sentencing outcomes. Hamill J noted that both a grant and a refusal of bail can carry the appearance of fettering the sentencing discretion, and that courts should remain alert to this distinction.
Under s 18(1)(i) of the Bail Act, the likelihood of a custodial sentence is not determinative: While the provision requires consideration of whether a custodial sentence is likely, Hamill J stressed that this is but one factor among many and does not resolve the bail application on its own.
Counterproductive bail conditions may warrant recalibration rather than refusal: The Court recognised that overly restrictive conditions (in this case, home detention-style restrictions imposed on a 14-year-old living with his mother) had arguably exacerbated the very risk they were designed to manage. This reflected the principle that bail conditions should be tailored to reduce, rather than inadvertently increase, the risk of reoffending.
Where a young person faces significant delay before a defended hearing, that delay weighs materially in the bail assessment: The prospect of LF remaining in custody for months awaiting a hearing in the Children's Court was a significant consideration under s 18(1)(h), particularly given his age and the regional court listing timelines involved.
Positive custodial progress and available support networks contributed to the conclusion that bail concerns could be sufficiently mitigated: Recent evidence of behavioural improvement, expressions of remorse, and the availability of family and NDIS support were central to Hamill J's analysis, with up-to-date Youth Justice reports playing an important role.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation:
- Bail Act 2013 (NSW), ss 18, 18(1)(h), 18(1)(i)

Cases:
- DC v R [2026] NSWSC 81
- Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Campbell [2015] NSWCCA 173
- Kangas v R [2015] NSWSC 1294
- R v AC (No 3) (Detention application) [2016] NSWSC 209
- R v Farrell [2015] NSWSC 1082