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Supreme Court 23 July 2026

R v Willcockson

[2026] NSWSC 872

HomicidePublic order & justice offences
SENTENCING MURDER JURY TRIAL RELEVANT FACTORS PERVERT THE COURSE OF JUSTICE

Citation: R v Willcockson [2026] NSWSC 872
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 23 July 2026
Judge(s): Harrison AJ

Background

The offender was convicted by jury of murdering Paul Davy on 22 November 2023 at Kendall, NSW. The offender had pleaded guilty to manslaughter but not guilty to murder. The jury rejected his account that the rifle discharged accidentally and that he did not know it was loaded.

The events arose from a dispute over a dog. After the offender's associate moved out of a shared arrangement and took a dog whose ownership was contested, the deceased came to the property to retrieve it. An argument developed through a locked flyscreen door. The deceased was unarmed and remained on the porch. After an exchange in which the deceased challenged the offender to shoot, the offender raised a rifle and fired a single shot. The deceased died from the gunshot wound to the chest.

While in custody following his arrest, the offender made a series of phone calls to associates attempting to construct a false alibi. He pleaded guilty to two counts of doing an act intending to pervert the course of justice in connection with those calls.

  • Whether the jury verdict was consistent with an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm, and how the court should find facts consistent with that verdict
  • What weight, if any, to give to the offender's claim of remorse, given that his evidence at trial was that the shooting was accidental
  • Whether the deceased's conduct immediately before his death (challenging the offender to shoot) amounted to extreme provocation under the sentencing legislation
  • What sentence was appropriate for the murder, having regard to the offender's personal circumstances, including a stoma requiring a colostomy bag and the limited evidence about treatment available in custody
  • What sentences were appropriate for the two counts of perverting the course of justice

Decision

Issue 1: Facts consistent with the jury verdict

Harrison AJ was satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the offender deliberately fired the rifle at the deceased with an intention either to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm. The court rejected the accidental discharge account, which the jury had also rejected. The court noted the offender's own post-offence statement to an associate, "Pauly said, 'You won't shoot me. Go on shoot me then', so I did," as consistent with a deliberate act.

Issue 2: Remorse

The court accepted that the offender had expressed remorse for his actions by the time of sentencing. However, the court approached this carefully, noting that his trial evidence of accidental discharge was inconsistent with genuine remorse. The court gave the remorse some weight, though tempered by this inconsistency.

Issue 3: Extreme provocation

The court considered whether the deceased's taunting words constituted extreme provocation within the meaning of the sentencing legislation, which can reduce the objective seriousness of a murder. The court's treatment of this issue reflected that the deceased was unarmed, remained behind a locked door, and that the verbal provocation, while present, did not rise to the level of extreme provocation capable of significantly mitigating the offence.

Issue 4: Personal circumstances and health

The court acknowledged the offender's stoma and the need to wear a colostomy bag as a relevant circumstance affecting the conditions of his imprisonment. The court noted there was little evidence about the treatment he had received for this condition in custody. The offender's background and history were also considered in accordance with the principles in Bugmy v The Queen, which recognises that the effects of profound disadvantage on an offender's conduct are not diminished by the passage of time.

Issue 5: Perverting the course of justice

For the two counts of perverting the course of justice, the court noted the sustained and deliberate nature of the phone calls from gaol, in which the offender attempted to co-opt associates into providing a false alibi for the murder. Fixed terms of 12 months each were imposed, with the terms staggered to reflect the two separate groups of calls.

Orders Made

  • Count 2 (pervert the course of justice): fixed term of 12 months imprisonment commencing 26 November 2023, expiring 25 November 2024
  • Count 3 (pervert the course of justice): fixed term of 12 months imprisonment commencing 26 February 2024, expiring 25 February 2025
  • Count 1 (murder): imprisonment for 22 years commencing 26 May 2024, expiring 25 May 2046, with a non-parole period of 16 years and 6 months expiring 25 November 2040
  • Earliest parole eligibility date: 26 November 2040
  • Warning issued to the offender pursuant to s 25C of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 that the provisions of that Act may apply to him

Key Takeaways

  • Where an offender's trial evidence asserts accidental discharge but the jury returns a murder verdict, the sentencing court must find facts consistent with the verdict and may treat the prior testimony as inconsistent with remorse, even where some remorse is later expressed.
  • A verbal challenge by an unarmed deceased, made from behind a locked door, did not constitute extreme provocation capable of materially reducing the objective seriousness of the murder in this case.
  • Under the principles affirmed in Bugmy v The Queen, an offender's background disadvantage remains relevant to sentencing regardless of the time that has elapsed, though it does not diminish the gravity of the offence.
  • Sustained attempts from custody to construct a false alibi, involving multiple phone calls to separate associates, were treated as distinct and serious acts warranting separate, staggered fixed terms for perverting the course of justice.
  • The Supreme Court noted that post-trial delays in sentencing proceedings are attributable to the parties' preparation requirements, not to the Court, and that community expectations of prompt sentencing must be balanced against the need for proper preparation.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 319
- Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), s 25C
- Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 21A(2)(j), 21A(3)( i), 25D(2)(b)(ii)

Cases
- Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37