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Court of Criminal Appeal

R v Leahy [2004] NSWCCA 148 revised - 18

[2004] NSWCCA 148

Theft & property

Citation: R v Leahy [2004] NSWCCA 148
Court: Court of Criminal Appeal, New South Wales
Date: 13 May 2004
Judge(s): Hodgson JA, Levine J, Hidden J


Background

The respondent pleaded guilty in the Penrith District Court to armed robbery. He had entered a Subway restaurant disguised by a balaclava and armed with a tomahawk, demanded money from two young female staff members, and left with $600 from the register. Patrons, including children, were present, and the incident caused significant trauma to one of the young victims.

The respondent was 35 years old at the time of the offence and carried a substantial criminal record, including prior terms of imprisonment. His offending was linked to a long-standing heroin and amphetamine addiction dating from his teenage years. He had made genuine attempts at rehabilitation in the years before the offence, spending periods at a residential drug rehabilitation program, but relapsed following the traumatic death of his flatmate in early 2023.

Nicholson DCJ adjourned sentencing under section 11 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, granted the respondent bail, and required him to undertake a residential drug rehabilitation program. The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed that decision.


  • Whether the sentencing judge erred in adjourning proceedings under section 11 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 where a substantial custodial sentence was effectively inevitable.
  • Whether evidence of rehabilitation obtained during an adjournment could serve any useful purpose in the sentencing exercise in circumstances where a full-time custodial sentence remained the most likely outcome.
  • Whether the sentencing judge's discretionary decision to grant the adjournment warranted appellate intervention.

Decision

The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal. The Crown argued that because a substantial custodial sentence was inevitable, no useful purpose could be served by further evidence of rehabilitation and the adjournment amounted to an error of principle. The Court rejected that submission.

Drawing on the analysis in R v Trindall (2002) 133 ACrimR 119, the Court confirmed that a section 11 adjournment is not limited to cases where a non-custodial outcome is possible. Even where full-time custody remains the most likely result, a sentencing court can benefit from more reliable information about an offender's rehabilitation prospects when determining both the head sentence and the non-parole period.

The Court also acknowledged the countervailing principle, stated in R v Palu (2002) 134 ACrimR 174, that unnecessary delay in sentencing causes its own injustice and that section 11 should be used sparingly. However, it found that Nicholson DCJ was plainly aware of these constraints. His Honour had made clear to the respondent that a full-time custodial sentence remained the probable outcome, and his decision that the adjournment would materially assist the sentencing process was one properly open to him.

Given the well-recognised limits on appellate intervention in Crown appeals against sentence, the Court was not persuaded that the discretionary decision should be set aside.


Orders Made

  • Crown appeal dismissed.

Key Takeaways

  • A section 11 adjournment under the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 is not confined to cases where a non-custodial sentence is in prospect. It may be appropriate where full-time custody remains the likely outcome, because evidence of rehabilitation can still inform both the head sentence and the non-parole period.
  • The Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed the approach in Trindall, Di Gregorio, and Williams, reinforcing that section 11 serves a broader sentencing function than simply enabling a rehabilitation-based escape from custody.
  • Under the principles in Palu, section 11 adjournments should be used sparingly. Unnecessary delay in sentencing is itself an injustice, and the power should be exercised only where delay is genuinely essential to a just sentencing outcome.
  • No error was established in a sentencing judge's decision to adjourn where the judge was demonstrably aware of the relevant principles, communicated the likely custodial outcome to the offender, and concluded the adjournment would materially assist the sentencing exercise.
  • In dismissing the appeal, the Court reaffirmed the constraints on Crown appeals against sentence: appellate intervention requires more than disagreement with a discretionary decision that was reasonably open to the sentencing judge.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation
- Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 11, 21A(2)
- Bail Act 1978 (NSW)

Cases
- Griffiths v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 293
- R v Trindall (2002) 133 ACrimR 119
- R v Palu (2002) 134 ACrimR 174
- R v Di Gregorio [2004] NSWCCA 9
- R v Williams [2004] NSWCCA 64