Citation: Monie & Ors v Commonwealth of Australia [2000] NSWSC 448
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales (Common Law Division)
Date: 26 May 2000
Judge(s): Master Malpass
Background
The plaintiffs were a husband, wife, and adult son who operated a farming property in rural New South Wales. In early 1993, they sought assistance from the Commonwealth Employment Service (CES) to find station hands. The CES sent out two candidates, one of whom had a criminal record dating to 1984 and had been released from prison only months earlier. The plaintiffs say they were not informed of this history. That employee was charged with, and ultimately convicted of, the attempted murder of the first plaintiff following a shooting at the property on 15 June 1993.
The first plaintiff suffered serious physical injuries in the shooting and did not see his assailant. The assailant presented himself in the aftermath as someone trying to help. All three plaintiffs subsequently experienced significant psychiatric problems, and the farming partnership suffered substantial financial losses.
The plaintiffs did not commence proceedings against the Commonwealth until September 1999, well after the standard six-year limitation period had expired in June 1996. They sought an extension of that period under the Limitation Act 1969, claiming the CES was negligent in placing a person with a serious criminal record without disclosing that record to them.
Legal Issues
- Whether the limitation period for the plaintiffs' negligence claims against the Commonwealth should be extended under s 60C of the Limitation Act 1969.
- Whether the plaintiffs had offered a satisfactory explanation for the delay between the shooting in June 1993 and the commencement of proceedings in September 1999.
- Whether the delay had caused actual prejudice to the defendant, particularly in light of the loss of CES records.
- Whether it was just and reasonable to grant the extension in the circumstances.
Decision
Master Malpass accepted the plaintiffs' explanation for the delay. The plaintiffs did not know with certainty who had shot the first plaintiff until after the criminal conviction in September 1997. Despite their suspicions, the assailant had denied involvement and the evidence against him was circumstantial. The Master regarded the decision to wait for the outcome of criminal proceedings as, at least in large part, an appropriate course.
On the question of prejudice, the defendant relied solely on the loss of records from the former Inverell CES office. It did not contend that any witnesses had become unavailable. The Master found that the defendant bore some responsibility for the loss of those records, noting that records had been placed in secondary storage without payment of storage costs, with poor cataloguing. The Master also noted that a key former CES employee had been identified by the plaintiffs and remained available and located in Inverell.
The Master was not satisfied that the delay had caused any significant actual prejudice, although he acknowledged the concept of presumptive prejudice arising from delay generally. Having regard to all the relevant circumstances under s 60E of the Act, he concluded that a fair trial could still be had and that it was just and reasonable to extend the limitation period.
Orders Made
- The limitation period for the plaintiffs' causes of action in negligence against the Commonwealth of Australia is extended for a period of 28 days from the date of judgment (26 May 2000).
- The costs of the Summons are to be costs in any proceedings commenced consequentially upon that extension.
Key Takeaways
- A plaintiff's decision to await the outcome of criminal proceedings before commencing a civil claim can constitute an adequate explanation for delay in an application to extend a limitation period, particularly where the identity of the wrongdoer remained genuinely uncertain.
- Under s 60C of the Limitation Act 1969, the applicant bears the onus of satisfying the court that an extension is just and reasonable, but a defendant asserting prejudice from delay carries an evidentiary burden to adduce evidence of actual prejudice.
- Where a defendant's own record-keeping failures contributed to the loss of documents, the court may give reduced weight to claims of prejudice arising from that loss.
- Presumptive prejudice (that is, prejudice presumed to arise from the passage of time) was acknowledged but did not, of itself, defeat the application in these circumstances.
- The availability of a key witness who could give direct evidence about what the CES did and did not disclose to the plaintiffs was a relevant factor in the Master's assessment that a fair trial remained possible.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation:
- Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), Division 3, Sub-Division 2, ss 60C and 60E
Cases cited: None cited in the judgment.