Citation: R v Katarzynski [2002] NSWSC 613
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 9 July 2002
Judge(s): Howie J
Background
The accused stood trial for murder following the shooting death of a man after a series of altercations at a Liverpool hotel in the early hours of 6 April 2001. It was not in dispute that the accused fired the weapon that killed the deceased. At the time of the shooting, there was ample evidence before the jury that the accused was intoxicated as a result of voluntary alcohol consumption.
The Crown conceded that the evidence raised a real possibility the accused was acting in self-defence when he fired the weapon, and that the applicable law was Part II, Division 3 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The trial was before a jury, and Howie J was called upon to give directions on how the jury should approach the self-defence provisions.
The central question raised by the judge at the close of the Crown case was how the accused's intoxication should interact with the statutory self-defence test, and specifically whether it was relevant to assessing the reasonableness of his response to the perceived threat.
Legal Issues
- Whether, under s 418(2) of the Crimes Act 1900, the accused's self-induced intoxication was relevant to assessing whether his belief that his conduct was necessary was genuine (the subjective limb).
- Whether the accused's intoxication was also relevant to the second, objective limb of s 418(2), namely whether his conduct was "a reasonable response in the circumstances as he perceived them."
- Whether the approach taken under the pre-existing common law (as expressed in Conlon) remained applicable under the new statutory self-defence regime.
Decision
Howie J identified that the s 418(2) self-defence test contains two distinct elements. The first is subjective: did the accused genuinely believe his conduct was necessary to defend himself? The second is objective: was that conduct a reasonable response in the circumstances as he perceived them? The judge held that intoxication is relevant to the first, subjective question, because it may have affected what the accused believed and how he perceived the circumstances confronting him.
However, the judge held that the accused's state of intoxication is irrelevant to the second, objective question of whether his response was reasonable. Howie J drew on the reasoning in McCullough v R, finding it logically incongruous to hold that conduct which would be unreasonable if performed sober could become reasonable because the actor was drunk. The objective reasonableness of a response cannot be assessed by reference to a self-induced impairment of judgment.
Howie J also found that s 418 was not a codification of the common law and should not be read as if it were. The general legislative policy on intoxication, set out in Part 11A of the Crimes Act, limits the use courts can make of intoxication when assessing criminal responsibility. To allow intoxication to inform the reasonableness assessment under s 418 would, in the judge's view, create an illogical and unacceptable inconsistency with that broader legislative framework.
Accordingly, Howie J directed the jury that it must take the accused's intoxication into account when considering whether he genuinely believed he needed to act in self-defence and when assessing the circumstances as he perceived them, but not when determining whether his response to those circumstances was objectively reasonable.
Orders Made
No orders were made in this decision.
Key Takeaways
- Under s 418(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), the self-defence test contains both a subjective limb (did the accused believe the conduct was necessary?) and an objective limb (was it a reasonable response in the circumstances as perceived?), and these two limbs attract different treatment of intoxication evidence.
- Self-induced intoxication is relevant to the subjective limb of s 418(2), because it bears on what the accused genuinely believed and how he perceived the circumstances at the time of the conduct.
- A person's self-induced intoxication is not relevant to the objective reasonableness of their response, as it would be logically incongruous for conduct unreasonable when sober to become reasonable because the actor was drunk.
- Section 418 of the Crimes Act 1900 was not intended as a codification of the common law, and the earlier common law approach in Conlon (which treated intoxication as relevant to both limbs of self-defence) does not govern the interpretation of the statutory provision.
- The general legislative policy in Part 11A of the Crimes Act, restricting how intoxication is used in assessing criminal responsibility, informed the Supreme Court's construction of s 418 and supports excluding intoxication from the reasonableness assessment.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation:
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), Part II Division 3, ss 418–423, 428 (self-defence provisions)
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), Part 11A (intoxication and criminal responsibility)
- Home Invasion (Occupants Protection) Act 1998 (NSW), ss 6–9, 11
- Crimes Amendment (Self Defence) Act 2001 (NSW), s 4
- Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas), s 46
Cases:
- R v Michael James Taylor [2002] NSWSC 610
- Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (Victoria) (1987) 162 CLR 645
- Dziduch (1990) 47 A Crim R 378
- R v Hawes (1994) 35 NSWLR 294
- R v Conlon (1993) 69 A Crim R 92
- McCullough v R [1982] Tas R 43
- R v Munro [2001] NSWCCA 187