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District Court 24 June 2004

R v James Patrick JOYCE

[2005] NSWDC 13

Traffic & driving
TRIAL PROPOSED DIRECTIONS TO THE JURY DISSOCIATIVE FUGUE VOLUNTARINESS DISEASE OF THE MIND AUTOMATISM

Citation: R v James Patrick JOYCE [2005] NSWDC 13
Court: District Court of NSW
Date: 24 June 2004
Judge(s): Berman SC DCJ

Background

The accused, a doctor, was charged with two counts of dangerous driving causing death. On the morning of 4 February 2001, he was driving home after an overnight shift at Shoalhaven Hospital when his vehicle collided head-on with a car carrying a husband and wife at a location on the Princes Highway known as Foxground. Both occupants of the other vehicle were severely injured (at [6]).

A retired highway patrol officer driving behind the accused observed his vehicle drift off the left side of the road approximately 15 times and cross to the wrong side of the road approximately five times after leaving the township of Berry. On three occasions the observer flashed his lights and sounded his horn; the accused's response was to raise his middle finger (at [5]). The accused accepted these facts but claimed to have no relevant memory of the period before the collision (at [7]).

The central factual contest was whether the accused was driving voluntarily at the time of the collision. The defence called psychiatrists and a psychologist to establish that the accused was in a dissociative fugue brought on by stress and his underlying, undiagnosed bipolar disorder. The Crown contended either that no fugue occurred or that, even if it did, the driving was still voluntary (at [8]).

Legal Issues

  • Whether the issue of sane automatism (non-insane automatism) should be left to the jury, and where the onus of proof lies.
  • Whether the issue of insane automatism should also be left to the jury, given expert evidence linking any fugue state to the accused's bipolar disorder.
  • Whether a person whose involuntary conduct is caused by a mental illness is entitled to an unqualified acquittal, or only a verdict of not guilty on grounds of mental illness.
  • Whether the jury should be directed that it could find the accused was in a dissociative fugue and yet still find that his actions were voluntary.

Decision

Issue 1: Automatism and onus of proof

The court accepted that the accused was entitled to have the issue of automatism left to the jury. Sufficient evidence had been raised to displace the ordinary presumption that acts are voluntary, placing the onus on the Crown to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was acting voluntarily (at [9]).

Issue 2: Whether insane automatism should also be left to the jury

The court held that insane automatism had to be left to the jury as a third verdict option. Psychiatrist Dr Kaplan, called by the defence, gave evidence that the accused would not have entered a dissociative fugue but for his bipolar disorder (at [13]). The court rejected the submission that this evidence should be read narrowly or discounted. Because the evidence raised the possibility that any involuntary conduct was caused by the accused's mental illness, the court was required to direct the jury that a verdict of not guilty on grounds of mental illness was available (at [21]). The court found that bipolar disorder, on the evidence presented, was capable of constituting a "disease of the mind" for these purposes (at [14]).

Issue 3: Whether an accused acting involuntarily due to mental illness can receive an unqualified acquittal

The court held that a person whose involuntary conduct is caused by a mental illness is entitled only to a verdict of not guilty on grounds of mental illness, not an unqualified acquittal (at [27]). The court drew on the joint and separate judgments in Queen v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30, finding that the various judges in that case spoke with one voice on this point: where automatism depends on the accused's unsoundness of mind, only a qualified acquittal is available (at [40]). The court also noted consistency with Canadian authority, with the decision in R v Parks, and with the longstanding legislative policy in NSW that those found not guilty on grounds of mental illness are subject to ongoing review by the Mental Health Review Tribunal rather than absolute release (at [47]-[53]).

Issue 4: Whether the jury could find voluntary driving despite the existence of a fugue state

The court held that the ultimate issue for the jury is voluntariness, not the separate factual question of whether the accused was in a dissociative fugue (at [55]-[56]). The court found there was evidence upon which the jury could conclude that even a person in a dissociative fugue may act voluntarily, in the sense of being conscious of what they are doing and choosing to do it (at [59], [66]). Voluntariness was defined as an action done by a person who is conscious of what the action is and who consciously chooses to do it, as distinct from intent or desire (at [60]-[65], [73]).

Orders Made

  • Directions to be given to the jury in accordance with the annexed "Questions for the Jury" document.

Key Takeaways

  • Where a defence of automatism is sufficiently raised, the onus shifts to the Crown to disprove voluntary conduct beyond reasonable doubt; but where expert evidence establishes that any involuntary state was caused by the accused's mental illness, the court must also leave the verdict of not guilty on grounds of mental illness to the jury (at [9], [21]).

  • A person whose involuntary conduct is attributable to a disease of the mind is entitled only to a verdict of not guilty on grounds of mental illness, not an unqualified acquittal. The District Court read the judgments in Queen v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30 as establishing this uniformly across the bench (at [27], [40]).

  • Bipolar disorder, in combination with evidence of its specific effects on the accused, can constitute a "disease of the mind" sufficient to support a mental illness verdict, even where the illness alone does not cause the involuntary state (at [14], [52]).

  • Voluntariness, in the context of automatism, means that an action is the conscious product of the actor's will: the person is aware of what they are doing and chooses to do it. This is distinct from the broader senses of "voluntariness" that arise in duress or necessity cases (at [60]-[64], [73]).

  • The existence of a dissociative fugue does not automatically establish that conduct was involuntary. Evidence that persons in a fugue state may retain awareness and control of their actions can support a jury finding of voluntary conduct even where a fugue is accepted as a reasonable possibility (at [59], [66]).

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation
- Criminal Lunatics Act 1800
- Mental Health Act
- Criminal Appeal Act

Cases
- R v Ayoub (1984) 10 A Crim R 313
- Hawkins v The Queen (1994) 177 CLR 500
- R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1
- Queen v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30
- R v Parks [1992] 2 SCR 871
- Bratty v Attorney-General (Northern Ireland) [1963] AC 386
- Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277
- Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56
- R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531
- Perka v The Queen (1985) 14 CCC 385
- R v Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 542