Citation: R v Amatto, Martin [2011] NSWDC 194
Court: District Court of New South Wales
Date: 7 December 2011
Judge: Nicholson SC DCJ
Background
The accused stood trial in relation to an alleged armed robbery at the Flying Horse Truck Stop on 10 October 2009. The Crown alleged the accused was the perpetrator and relied, in part, on fingerprint evidence lifted from the crime scene.
Sergeant Brian Worboys, tendered by the prosecution as an expert in fingerprint science, had identified one of the lifted fingerprints as matching the right middle finger of the accused. The defence brought an interlocutory application to exclude that expert opinion evidence.
Legal Issues
- Whether the jury was capable of making its own comparison between the crime scene fingerprint and the accused's fingerprints, without the assistance of expert opinion evidence.
- Whether expert fingerprint identification evidence constituted evidence based on "specialised knowledge" that was necessary and admissible at trial.
Decision
The defence relied on the principle drawn from Mundarra Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650, arguing that the Crown could simply tender both sets of fingerprints and allow the jury to reach its own conclusion on whether they matched. On this basis, the defence submitted that Sergeant Worboys' opinion was unnecessary and therefore not relevant.
Nicholson SC DCJ rejected this argument. His Honour noted that Sergeant Worboys' comparison involved examination of pattern types, ridge flow, friction ridge characteristics, their relative positions, and the number of intervening ridges between those characteristics. The identification process also drew on knowledge of the chemical compounds used in dusting or spraying surfaces to lift prints. Together, these elements amounted to specialised knowledge that an untrained person does not possess.
The court found it would be dangerous to permit fingerprint comparisons by persons without such specialised knowledge. His Honour illustrated the point with examples of non-expert police officers purporting to identify fingerprints by sight alone, describing both scenarios as unacceptably unreliable. The suggestion that fingerprints were amenable to lay comparison was squarely rejected.
Orders Made
No formal orders were reproduced in the provided text, however the court's ruling was that the defence objection to the expert fingerprint evidence was rejected.
Key Takeaways
- The District Court confirmed that fingerprint identification involves specialised knowledge, including analysis of ridge flow, friction ridge characteristics, relative positioning, and the properties of dusting compounds, and is not suitable for lay comparison.
- Applying the Mundarra Smith principle does not extend to fingerprint evidence where the comparison requires expertise beyond the competence of an untrained observer, including jurors.
- Expert opinion evidence from a qualified fingerprint examiner remains necessary and admissible where the identification process relies on such specialised knowledge.
- Allowing untrained observers, whether jurors or investigating officers, to draw their own fingerprint comparisons without expert guidance was characterised by the court as dangerous.
- Abandoning the concept of a requisite number of identification points, an implicit consequence of the defence's argument, was treated as an obviously unacceptable outcome that further illustrated the flaw in the submission.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Cases:
- Mundarra Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650
Legislation:
No specific legislation was cited in the judgment or metadata.