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District Court

Joel Nathan Williams, Gloria May Williams, Robert Lee Anthony Williams v The State of New South Wales

[2013] NSWDC 249

Assault & violence

Citation: [2013] NSWDC 249
Court: District Court of New South Wales
Date: 2 October 2013
Judge: Judge MJ Finnane QC DCJ


Background

Three Aboriginal plaintiffs commenced civil proceedings against the State of New South Wales following their arrests by police in November 2009. The arrests occurred at Kyogle's Masonic Hall, where the plaintiffs were participating in rehearsals for an Aboriginal cultural event. The first plaintiff, known to local police who also knew his address, was arrested for shoplifting, a relatively minor offence. Four officers entered the hall, and when the other two plaintiffs intervened to resist the arrest, they were charged with hindering police in the execution of their duty.

All three were convicted before a Local Court magistrate. The second and third plaintiffs successfully appealed to the Supreme Court, where the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) agreed the magistrate had erred by failing to apply the necessity requirements in s 99(3) of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002. Their convictions were set aside. The first plaintiff's conviction was subsequently set aside following intervention by the Attorney General.

In the civil proceedings, the first plaintiff claimed damages for assault and false imprisonment. The second and third plaintiffs each claimed damages for assault (with the third also claiming false imprisonment). The plaintiffs brought a notice of motion seeking to strike out three paragraphs in the State's defence, each asserting that the first plaintiff's arrest was lawful.


  • Whether s 99(3) of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 imposed a necessity requirement that police failed to satisfy before arresting the first plaintiff.
  • Whether the State could, in civil proceedings, assert the lawfulness of the first plaintiff's arrest after the DPP had conceded in earlier criminal proceedings that the arrest was unlawful, and after the Attorney General had secured the quashing of the first plaintiff's own conviction.
  • Whether the defence paragraphs asserting lawful arrest constituted an abuse of process or disclosed no reasonable defence, warranting their being struck out.

Decision

Judge Finnane held that the magistrate had clearly erred in applying only s 99(2) of LEPRA while ignoring s 99(3), which imposes a further requirement. Under s 99(3), an officer must not arrest a person unless the officer suspects on reasonable grounds that arrest is necessary for one or more prescribed purposes. Given that police knew the first plaintiff, knew his address, and were dealing with a minor shoplifting offence, the court found it difficult to see how any of those necessary purposes could be established.

The court characterised the conduct of the four officers as "overbearing," finding it was largely responsible for provoking the intervention of the second and third plaintiffs. The court observed that the second and third plaintiffs could only have been guilty of hindering police in the execution of their duty if the arrest itself was lawful. Because the Supreme Court had determined, with the DPP's agreement, that it was not, there had effectively already been a judicial determination on the underlying question of lawfulness.

The court rejected the State's submission that it was entitled to a full trial on the facts. While noting this was not a conventional issue estoppel case (a doctrine that prevents a party from re-litigating facts already decided in earlier proceedings), the court held that a party should not be permitted to litigate in civil proceedings facts it had already agreed, in earlier criminal proceedings, should be determined against it. The State's conduct in the prior proceedings, through both the DPP and the Attorney General, made it entirely inappropriate to now assert a contradictory position.

The court struck out paragraphs 23, 25, and 28 of the defence. Those paragraphs had each sought to rely on the lawfulness of the first plaintiff's arrest to justify the actions taken against all three plaintiffs.


Orders Made

  • Paragraphs 23, 25 and 28 of the defendant's defence were struck out.
  • Costs were reserved, with the parties to be heard.

Key Takeaways

  • The District Court confirmed that s 99(3) of LEPRA operates as a mandatory threshold: a police officer must not arrest a person unless the officer holds a reasonable suspicion that arrest is necessary for a specific statutory purpose, even where s 99(2) grounds exist.
  • Where police knew a suspect, knew his address, and the alleged offence was minor shoplifting, the court found it difficult to identify any s 99(3) purpose that could justify the arrest.
  • A party is not entitled to litigate in civil proceedings facts that it has already conceded should be determined against it in related criminal proceedings. The court treated this as a matter of abuse of process rather than strict issue estoppel.
  • The State's position was rendered untenable by two prior executive concessions: the DPP agreeing the magistrate erred in the criminal appeal, and the Attorney General procuring the quashing of the first plaintiff's conviction.
  • In granting a strike-out on abuse of process grounds, the court was not applying issue estoppel (which requires a final judgment on an issue between the same parties) but rather a broader principle that the State could not contradict in civil proceedings what its own representatives had conceded in criminal proceedings.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation:
- Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), particularly ss 99(2) and 99(3)
- Crown Proceedings Act 1988 (NSW)
- Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW)

Cases:
- Michael James Nawrot v The Chief Constable of Hampshire Police 1992 WL 895907 (Court of Appeal, England and Wales, 9 December 1991) (unreported; cited by the defendant but distinguished by the court as fact-specific and stating no new principle)