Citation: R v Crispe (No 2) [2014] NSWDC 201
Court: District Court of New South Wales
Date: 29 July 2014
Judge: Cogswell SC DCJ
Background
The accused was charged with wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm under s 33(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), following an incident on 16 June 2012. Her estranged husband arrived at her home to deliver their two young children when she attacked him with a knife and scissors. He sustained serious injuries, including a severed tendon in his hand and lacerations to his scalp and eyebrow, but survived.
The accused pleaded not guilty on the basis that she was mentally ill at the time of the offence so as not to be responsible in law for her actions. Both parties jointly applied for trial by judge alone, which the court ordered under s 132(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW).
In the lead-up to the trial, the court had separately determined that the accused was fit to stand trial. The matter proceeded before Cogswell SC DCJ, with two expert psychiatric reports tendered in evidence.
Legal Issues
- Whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused performed the acts charged (the actus reus)
- Whether the defence had established on the balance of probabilities that the accused was mentally ill at the time of the offence so as not to be responsible according to law for her actions, under the test in The King v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182
- Specifically, whether the accused either did not know the physical nature of her act, or was not able to appreciate that what she was doing was wrong
Decision
The court was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did perform the acts charged. This finding was not contested: defence counsel conceded that it was the accused's acts that caused the wounds, and the prosecution likewise submitted that the actus reus was established. Witness accounts, including those of the victim, the accused's parents, and neighbours, consistently confirmed her role in the stabbing.
On the mental illness defence, the court considered unanimous expert evidence from two psychiatrists, Drs Furst and Allnutt, who agreed the accused was suffering from psychotic depression at the time of the offence. The prosecution accepted their opinions and did not seek to challenge them. Applying the Porter test, the court first examined whether the accused knew the physical nature of her act, and found it was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that she lacked such knowledge.
However, the court was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that, by reason of her mental illness, the accused was unable to appreciate the wrongness of her actions. She could not, at the relevant time, reason about what she was doing with a moderate degree of sense and composure so as to realise it was wrong by the everyday standards of reasonable people. The court noted that the defence as to mental illness falls to be determined before any consideration of the mental element (intent) required for the principal offence.
Accordingly, the court returned a special verdict under s 38 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 of not guilty by reason of mental illness. The court also noted its awareness of the orders available under s 39 of that Act and the role of the Mental Health Review Tribunal in supervising forensic patients following such a verdict.
Orders Made
• The accused is found not guilty by reason of mental illness on count 1 of the indictment
Key Takeaways
- The District Court confirmed that the mental illness defence requires the accused to establish, on the balance of probabilities, either that they did not know the physical nature of their act, or that they could not appreciate its wrongness by the standards of reasonable people, applying the test from The King v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182.
- A special verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness under s 38 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 is available where the court, as the tribunal of fact, is satisfied of mental illness to that standard, even where the accused's commission of the acts charged is not in dispute.
- Unanimous, unchallenged expert psychiatric evidence will ordinarily be accepted by a tribunal of fact in the absence of other material casting doubt on it.
- Under the procedural framework applied here, the question of mental illness is resolved before the court turns to whether the mental element (intent) required for the charged offence was present.
- Where a special verdict is returned, the court must have regard to ss 37 and 39 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990, including the legal and practical consequences of the verdict and the orders available, before making any findings.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 33(1)(a)
- Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), s 132(2)
- Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW), ss 37, 38, 39
Cases
- The King v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182
- Hawkins v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 500
- Regina v Minani [2005] NSWCCA 226; 63 NSWLR 490