Citation: R v Eriksen (No 6) [2025] NSWSC 1468
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 19 June 2025
Judge(s): Coleman J
Background
The accused faced trial for the murder of the deceased, who died on 9 April 2023 from numerous stab wounds. The accused, who was self-represented, accepted that he had stabbed the deceased but denied that the act was voluntary or wilful. He also denied having the intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm.
The defence the accused sought to raise was "sane automatism by dissociation," specifically that he had been sleepwalking at the time he inflicted the fatal wounds. This defence, if established, would entitle an accused to an outright acquittal on the basis that the act occurred independently of the will, and did not arise from a disease of the mind.
Coleman J was required to determine, before closing addresses and jury directions, whether there was sufficient evidence to leave the question of automatism to the jury at all.
Legal Issues
- Whether there was any evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that the accused's actions when stabbing the deceased were not voluntary or wilful
- Whether the accused had discharged the evidential burden required to raise sane automatism as a live issue for the jury
- Whether the absence of expert medical evidence was fatal to the defence being left to the jury
Decision
Coleman J set out the governing principles clearly. Sane automatism entitles an accused to an outright acquittal where the charged act occurred independently of the will and did not arise from a disease of the mind. Sleepwalking is a recognised "paradigm case" of sane automatism. However, established authority requires more than a bare assertion from the accused: there must be some evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer a genuine possibility that the act was involuntary.
The High Court in Falconer confirmed that a claim of involuntariness unsupported by expert medical evidence identifying the relevant mental state, explaining its cause, and connecting it to the accused at the relevant time, is almost certain to be treated as frivolous. The evidentiary burden falls on the accused to produce material capable of displacing ordinary human experience that acts are voluntary.
The trial was adjourned on eight occasions from its scheduled commencement to allow the accused every opportunity to obtain expert evidence. The Crown even facilitated contact with a sleep specialist on the accused's behalf. That specialist ultimately declined to provide an assessment, reportedly because no evidence had been provided to him that the accused had been asleep at the relevant time.
The accused elected not to give or call evidence at trial. He pointed to several items in the Crown case: photographs of blood-stained light switches, and body-worn camera footage in which he told police "I don't know" and "it just happened." Coleman J found that none of this material was capable of supporting the necessary inference. Photographs of blood-stained switches could not establish that the accused had been sleepwalking, and responses to police indicating a lack of memory, taken at their highest, showed only that the accused did not remember certain things. Without independent evidence linking such memory gaps to a condition affecting the voluntariness of his actions, no sufficient foundation existed. The court accordingly refused to leave the automatism issue to the jury.
Orders Made
No orders were made in this decision.
Key Takeaways
- The Supreme Court confirmed that a bare assertion of sleepwalking, whether made to police or in court, is insufficient to raise sane automatism as a live issue for the jury; some independent evidence capable of supporting the inference of involuntariness is required.
- Under the principles in Falconer, expert medical evidence identifying the relevant mental state, explaining its cause, and connecting it to the accused at the time of the act is, in practical terms, almost always necessary for a sane automatism defence to be left to the jury.
- A failure of recollection, even if genuinely established, does not of itself support an inference of automatism; there must be independent material linking the memory deficit to a condition affecting voluntary control of actions.
- The accused's self-represented status and custodial circumstances were taken into account in granting extensive adjournments, but those practical accommodations did not alter the underlying legal threshold for the defence to be left to the jury.
- Where the accused leads no evidence, the evidentiary foundation for automatism must be found within the Crown case itself; circumstantial items that are equally consistent with voluntary action will not suffice.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Cases:
- R v DB [2022] NSWCCA 87
- R v Falconer [1990] HCA 49; (1990) 171 CLR 30
- R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266
- R v Tsigos [1964-1965] NSWR 1607
- Woodbridge v R [2010] NSWCCA 185
- Dragan v R [2010] NSWCCA 329
Legislation: No specific legislation cited in the judgment.