Citation: Sampson v R [2026] NSWCCA 117
Court: Court of Criminal Appeal
Date: 10 August 2026
Judge(s): Leeming JA; McNaughton J; Sweeney J
Background
The appellant was sentenced in the District Court in June 2024 for seven sexual offences against four child victims, all of whom were connected to him through family relationships. The offending spanned approximately 18 years, from 2003 to 2021. The appellant was aged 18 or 19 at the time of the first offence and 37 at the time of the last. He pleaded guilty and received an aggregate sentence of 7 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years and 3 months.
The sentencing judge considered the appellant's youth (relevant only to the earliest offence) and his childhood background, including disrupted schooling and transient care arrangements in early life. His Honour found that youth reduced the appellant's moral culpability "slightly" for Count 1, and that his background reduced it "to a limited degree." The indicative sentences reflected those findings.
The appellant filed his application for leave to appeal out of time. He explained that he had not understood his appeal rights and only sought Legal Aid assistance after conversations with other prisoners. Legal Aid was instructed in October 2025 and the application was filed in April 2026.
Legal Issues
- Whether the sentencing judge erred by failing to have regard to the appellant's youth when considering the weight to be given to general deterrence.
- Whether the sentencing judge erred by failing to explain in the reasons for sentence what impact the appellant's youth had on general deterrence.
- Whether the sentencing judge erred by failing to have regard to the appellant's childhood and background when considering the weight to be given to general deterrence.
- Whether the sentencing judge erred by failing to explain in the reasons for sentence what impact that background had on general deterrence.
Decision
Extension of time: The Court accepted the appellant's explanation for the delay, noting that his lack of understanding of appeal rights was genuine and that his legal representatives acted without undue delay once instructed. An extension of time was granted.
Ground 1 (youth) and Ground 2 (background): failure to have regard: The Court found no error in the sentencing judge's approach. His Honour expressly acknowledged the appellant's youth in relation to Count 1 and found it reduced moral culpability, albeit only slightly. Similarly, his Honour addressed the appellant's disrupted upbringing and found a limited reduction in moral culpability. Those findings were reflected in the indicative sentences.
Ground 1 and Ground 2: failure to explain the impact on general deterrence: The Court held that no further articulation was required in the circumstances. Relying on the Court of Criminal Appeal's reasoning in Taylor v R [2026] NSWCCA 32, the Court confirmed that where a submission of reduced moral culpability is made and the sentencing judge makes a finding on it, the extent to which the judge must then explain how that finding bears on individual sentencing factors (such as general deterrence) depends on the facts of the particular case. Where the reduction in moral culpability is minor, it is not necessary for the judge to separately trace its effect on each sentencing consideration. The Court noted that requiring further articulation in such circumstances would be artificial, particularly where no specific submission had been made to the sentencing judge about the interaction between the reduction in moral culpability and general deterrence.
The Court emphasised that the grounds rested on an "over-elaborate reading" of what Taylor actually required, and that the present case involved only slight or limited reductions in moral culpability, not a situation demanding extended analysis.
Orders Made
- Time for filing the application for leave to appeal extended to 16 April 2026.
- Leave to appeal granted.
- Appeal dismissed.
Key Takeaways
- A sentencing court that finds a reduction in an offender's moral culpability due to youth or background is not automatically required to articulate, in its reasons, how that reduction specifically affects each sentencing factor such as general deterrence. The degree of further explanation required depends on the facts, including the extent of the reduction found.
- Where a reduction in moral culpability is minor or limited, and no specific submission was made to the sentencing judge about its effect on general deterrence, the Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed it would be artificial to demand further articulation.
- The decision reinforces that Taylor v R [2026] NSWCCA 32 does not impose a prescriptive obligation to enumerate the downstream effects of a reduced moral culpability finding on every sentencing consideration. Its requirements are calibrated to the facts of each case.
- Upholding the original sentence, the Court of Criminal Appeal found that the indicative sentences for individual counts, and the aggregate sentence, already reflected the favourable findings on youth and background.
- An extension of time to appeal will be granted where an unrepresented prisoner's delay results from genuine ignorance of appeal rights, provided legal representatives proceed without undue delay once instructed.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation
- Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), s 15A
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) , 578A
Cases
- Kentwell v The Queen ( 2014) 252 CLR 601 ; [2014] HCA 37
- MA v R [2026] NSWCCA 92
- Taylor v R [2026] NSWCCA 32
- TM v R [2023] NSWCCA 185
- YZ v R [2025] NSWCCA 165