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Court of Criminal Appeal 8 April 2026

Taylor v R

[2026] NSWCCA 32

Sexual offences
SENTENCE — APPEAL DISMISSED

Citation: Taylor v R [2026] NSWCCA 32
Court: Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)
Date: 8 April 2026
Judge(s): N Adams CJ at CL (primary judgment); Fagan J (agreeing at [157]–[159]); Boulten J (agreeing at [160]–[170])

Background

The applicant, a 20-year-old man at the time of offending, pleaded guilty to eleven State and Commonwealth sexual offences involving four male child victims aged 13 and 15. The offending occurred between approximately August 2022 and March 2023. The applicant had formed friendships with the victims — three of whom were high school students he met through a coaching role at a rugby union club, and a fourth who was 13 years old at the time. The offending included multiple instances of sexual touching, sending indecent material to minors via Snapchat, and using deception to cause a 13-year-old victim to produce child abuse material.

On 22 November 2024, the applicant was sentenced by Judge Ellis in the District Court at Newcastle. For the State offences, after applying a 25 per cent discount for guilty pleas, his Honour imposed an aggregate sentence of 7 years and 6 months' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years, commencing on 9 March 2023. For the Commonwealth offences, the applicant was released on a recognisance in the sum of $2,000, subject to a condition of good behaviour for 3 years under s 20(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).

The sentencing judge had before him expert psychological evidence that the applicant presented with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and traits consistent with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The applicant sought leave to appeal the aggregate State sentence on a single ground: that the sentencing judge erred by failing to address whether these neurodevelopmental disorders reduced his moral culpability and diminished the weight to be given to general deterrence.

  • Whether the sentencing judge erred in failing to make findings as to whether the applicant's diagnosed neurodevelopmental disorders (ADHD and ASD traits) reduced his moral culpability.
  • Whether the sentencing judge was required to consider the impact of any reduced moral culpability on the weight to be given to general deterrence as a sentencing purpose.
  • If error was established, whether a lesser sentence was warranted on re-sentence.
  • Whether a new psychologist's report should be admitted as fresh evidence on re-sentence.

Decision

The Court of Criminal Appeal unanimously found that sentencing error was established but ultimately dismissed the appeal, concluding that no lesser sentence was warranted on re-sentence.

The obligation to address moral culpability: N Adams CJ at CL, delivering the primary judgment, held that where a submission is made that an offender's mental health or cognitive impairment reduces their moral culpability, the sentencing judge is required to consider that submission and make a finding on the point. This principle draws on established High Court and intermediate appellate authority, including Muldrock v The Queen, Bugmy v The Queen, and DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa. The Chief Judge also noted the more recent decisions of NK v R [2025] NSWCCA 73 and DG v R [2025] NSWCCA 137. Where moral culpability is found to be reduced, the sentencing judge must then consider how that finding bears on the weight to be given to sentencing factors, particularly general deterrence.

Error established: The Court found that while the sentencing judge had taken into account the expert evidence regarding the applicant's diagnoses, his Honour made no finding as to the extent of any reduction in moral culpability, the relevance of general deterrence, or the concept of moral culpability at all. The Court emphasised that these findings could not simply be inferred from the ex tempore sentencing remarks, applying Sampson v R [2025] NSWCCA 25. This was significant because the Crown had conceded at sentence that the applicant's moral culpability was reduced, but the parties had joined issue on the extent of that reduction — a live dispute the sentencing judge was required to resolve.

Re-sentence and outcome: Having found error, the Court proceeded to re-sentence. The applicant sought to adduce a new psychologist's report on re-sentence, but the Court declined to admit it, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify its reception, applying R v Sabbah [2025] NSWCCA 203. On re-sentence, the Court determined — having properly considered the moral culpability issue — that no lesser sentence was warranted. The aggregate sentence of 7 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 4 years was not disturbed.

Orders Made

  • Leave to appeal was granted.
  • The appeal was dismissed.
  • The original sentence was confirmed (no lesser sentence warranted on re-sentence).
  • The application to admit a new psychologist's report on re-sentence was refused.

Key Takeaways

  • Where a submission is made that mental health or cognitive impairment reduces moral culpability, the sentencing judge must make an explicit finding on the issue. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that it is insufficient merely to "take into account" relevant expert evidence without addressing how it bears on culpability and the weight given to sentencing purposes.

  • A live dispute over the extent of any reduction in moral culpability requires judicial determination. The Court found that even where the Crown concedes that moral culpability is reduced, disagreement between the parties on the degree of that reduction constitutes a contested issue the sentencing judge must resolve, and a failure to do so constitutes appealable error.

  • In dismissing the appeal, the Court confirmed that identification of sentencing error does not necessarily lead to a lesser sentence. On re-sentence, the original sentence was found to remain appropriate despite the established error, illustrating the well-recognised distinction between error and outcome.

  • Exceptional circumstances were required before fresh evidence could be admitted on re-sentence. The Court held that a successful appeal on a point relating to expert evidence does not automatically open the door to adducing new or updated expert reports.

  • Ex tempore delivery of sentencing remarks does not relieve a judge of the obligation to address contested submissions expressly. The Court of Criminal Appeal closely scrutinised the sentencing remarks for the presence or absence of required reasoning steps concerning mental health, moral culpability, and the weight of sentencing purposes.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation:
- Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 3A, 5, 21A
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 66DB(a), 91G(1)(a), 91H(2)
- Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 20
- Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), ss 5, 6
- Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 474.27A(1)

Key cases:
- Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39
- Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37
- Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194
- NK v R [2025] NSWCCA 73
- DG v R [2025] NSWCCA 137
- Sampson v R [2025] NSWCCA 25
- R v Sabbah [2025] NSWCCA 203
- Kentwell v The Queen (2014) 252 CLR 601; [2014] HCA 37
- You, Jae Bok v R [2020] NSWCCA 71
- Hay v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2020] NSWCA 75
- Harris v R [2021] NSWCCA 322
- DS v R; DM v R (2022) 109 NSWLR 82; [2022] NSWCCA 156
- *DK v Director of Public Prosecut