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Court of Criminal Appeal 3 July 2026

Steele v R

[2026] NSWCCA 99

Assault & violenceTheft & property

Citation: Steele v R [2026] NSWCCA 99
Court: Court of Criminal Appeal, NSW
Date: 3 July 2026
Judge(s): Ward P, Sweeney J, Emmett J

Background

The applicant was convicted by a jury in July 2024 of two serious offences: detaining a person in company with intent to intimidate, with actual bodily harm occasioned (count 1), and robbery of cash and a gold watch (count 3). In the same proceedings, the jury acquitted the applicant of recklessly wounding in company (count 2). The three counts arose from the same criminal episode.

The applicant sought leave to appeal the convictions on the ground that the guilty verdicts on counts 1 and 3 were inconsistent with the not-guilty verdict on count 2. Central to the argument was the evidence of a witness, referred to as RS, whose credibility the applicant said the jury must have doubted when acquitting on count 2, and that doubt should have carried through to the other counts.

The application was filed in March 2026, more than 18 months after conviction, requiring the court to first consider whether an extension of time should be granted.

  • Whether the application for an extension of time to appeal should be granted, given the 18-month delay and the absence of a satisfactory explanation
  • Whether the jury's acquittal on count 2 necessarily involved a reasonable doubt as to the credibility of witness RS
  • Whether any reasonable doubt about RS's credibility required a conclusion of reasonable doubt on counts 1 and 3
  • Whether a rational jury, acting on the trial judge's directions, could properly convict on counts 1 and 3 while acquitting on count 2

Decision

Extension of Time:
The application was lodged well outside the statutory time limit. The applicant's legal team filed a notice of intention to appeal within time, but subsequently allowed significant delays to accumulate. The completed brief was ready by July 2025, yet the solicitor with carriage did not begin reviewing it until October 2025, and counsel did not provide submissions until late February 2026. The court declined to accept heavy workloads and the summer shutdown period as a satisfactory explanation, noting that the team was already aware the brief was obtained approximately 12 months after conviction.

The court nonetheless granted the extension because the delay could not be attributed to the applicant personally and the Crown pointed to no specific prejudice. Ward P endorsed Emmett J's remarks that the profession should not assume extensions will be granted as a matter of course, particularly where a conviction is challenged and a retrial might be required, which could prejudice complainants and the community as well as the applicant.

Ground 1: Inconsistency of Verdicts:
The court rejected the applicant's core argument. The case was not left to the jury on the basis that it could only convict if it accepted the whole of RS's evidence on each count. The trial judge's directions made clear that the jury could accept or reject any witness's evidence in whole or in part, and that it should consider all the evidence in respect of each count separately.

The court identified several independent rational pathways by which the jury could have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on counts 1 and 3 while acquitting on count 2. First, the jury may have treated RS's evidence as probably truthful but sought corroboration before convicting; corroborating evidence was available for counts 1 and 3 but not for the specific factual question underlying count 2 (the location of the cutting). Second, the jury may have accepted RS's general credibility while treating his evidence of the applicant's admission regarding the cutting with particular caution, especially given the trial judge's specific directions about admissions and the existence of prior police statements suggesting the cutting occurred elsewhere. Third, the jury may have assessed RS's demeanour differently when he gave his account of the admission, a matter within the jury's exclusive province. Fourth, objective evidence, including DNA evidence placing the applicant in the vehicle and a witness's account of the robbery, independently supported the counts 1 and 3 findings.

The court applied the test in MFA v The Queen: the question is whether there is a rational way in which the jury could have reached the mixed verdicts. Multiple overlapping rational pathways existed here, reinforcing the conclusion that the verdicts were neither unreasonable nor illogical.

Orders Made

  • Extension of time to appeal granted
  • Leave to appeal granted
  • Appeal dismissed

Key Takeaways

  • An acquittal on one count does not automatically render guilty verdicts on other counts inconsistent: the critical question, following MFA v The Queen, is whether a rational jury acting on the trial judge's directions could have reached those mixed verdicts.
  • Where evidence in support of different counts is distinguishable, including through available corroboration, objective evidence, or specific jury directions about particular categories of evidence such as admissions, a jury may rationally differentiate between counts even when the same witness features prominently across all of them.
  • The Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed that legal representatives must not assume extensions of time will be granted as of right; in an appropriate case, particularly where a retrial could prejudice complainants or the community, the court may refuse an extension entirely.
  • Delay caused solely by a legal team's workload and professional scheduling, without personal fault on the applicant's part, did not preclude the grant of an extension, but the court signalled that the proximity of those circumstances to a refusal is real where no satisfactory explanation is provided.
  • A jury's advantage in assessing witness demeanour in the courtroom is a factor the Court of Criminal Appeal recognised as capable of contributing to differentiated findings of credibility across different aspects of the same witness's evidence.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation:
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 35, 86, 97
- Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 10

Cases:
- MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606; [2002] HCA 53 (applied)
- Mackenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348; [1996] HCA 35 (cited)
- R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308; [2016] HCA 35 (cited)
- R v Kirkman (1987) 44 SASR 591 (cited)
- Jones v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 439; [1997] HCA 56 (cited)
- AH v R [2019] NSWCCA 152 (cited)
- DB v R [2026] NSWCCA 29 (cited)
- Ganji v R [2019] NSWCCA 208 (cited)