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District Court 27 March 2026

R v Sabra

[2026] NSWDC 70

Traffic & driving
YEAR

Citation: R v Sabra [2026] NSWDC 70
Court: District Court of New South Wales (Criminal)
Date: 27 March 2026
Judge(s): Newlinds SC DCJ

Background

This matter arose from a fatal collision on 11 November 2023 at the intersection of Fifth Avenue and Eighth Avenue, Campsie. The accused was driving his father's Toyota motor vehicle southbound along Fifth Avenue at approximately 52 km/h in a 50 km/h zone when the vehicle struck an 83-year-old woman, Mrs Hayat Nasr, who was fatally injured.

The accused had initially been charged with dangerous driving causing death under s 52A(1)(c) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). A "back-up charge" of negligent driving causing death under s 117 of the Roads and Transport Act 2013 (NSW) had been referred from the Local Court under s 168 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW). After a four-day trial in March 2026, a jury of 12 acquitted the accused of the dangerous driving charge. Newlinds SC DCJ was then required to determine the negligent driving charge sitting, in effect, as a magistrate, on the same body of evidence that had been before the jury.

The Crown's case on both charges was particularised in the same way: the accused failed to keep a proper lookout for pedestrians near the intersection. The central factual contest was not about speed, intoxication, or distraction, but about the physical position and movements of the deceased immediately before the collision — a matter on which there was no direct evidence.

  • Whether the accused was guilty of negligent driving causing death, particularised as a failure to keep a proper lookout for pedestrians in the vicinity of the intersection.
  • Whether the Crown could prove beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was still in the process of crossing Fifth Avenue (and had not yet reached the central median strip) at the time of impact — this being identified as an essential intermediate fact in the chain of reasoning towards guilt.
  • Whether there was a competing reasonable inference, consistent with the evidence, under which the accused could not be found to have failed to keep a proper lookout.
  • The proper approach to inferential reasoning in a criminal case, including the requirement that the Crown's inference be the only rational inference available.

Decision

His Honour began by identifying the critical factual question: where was Mrs Nasr, and what was she doing, immediately before the collision? CCTV footage captured Mrs Nasr walking westward along Eighth Avenue towards Fifth Avenue, but she disappeared from view before entering the intersection. The footage then showed several cars passing along Fifth Avenue with identifiable gaps between them. Approximately one minute and 15 seconds after Mrs Nasr disappeared from view, the audio captured the collision and the footage showed the accused's vehicle with Mrs Nasr's body cartwheeling over it.

The Crown contended that Mrs Nasr was still crossing Fifth Avenue and had not yet reached the central median strip when she was struck — meaning she should have been visible to the accused for an appreciable distance if he had been keeping a proper lookout. The accused's account, given in a 000 call and a subsequent police interview while he was visibly in shock, was that Mrs Nasr "came from the right-hand side," had been on the median strip, and stepped or "jumped" back into his path at the last moment. His Honour noted the accused consistently indicated Mrs Nasr came from his right — consistent with her having reached the median strip and then moved back eastward into his lane.

Newlinds SC DCJ identified the Crown's contention about Mrs Nasr's position as an "intermediate fact" — an indispensable link in the chain of reasoning — that had to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. His Honour found that the accused's account was consistent with all the other evidence, including the physical damage to the right-hand (driver's) side of the vehicle, the location of impact near the median strip, and the time gap between Mrs Nasr disappearing from the CCTV and the collision (which was long enough for her to have reached the median and then turned back). There was no reason to reject the accused's account, and indeed his Honour observed there was no direct evidence contradicting it.

Applying the well-established principle that the Crown's inference must be the only rational inference available, his Honour concluded that the competing inference — that Mrs Nasr had reached the median strip and then unexpectedly moved back into the accused's path — was reasonably open on the evidence. If that scenario occurred, the accused could not sensibly be said to have failed to keep a proper lookout; no reasonable driver could have avoided the collision. Because the Crown could not exclude this competing inference, the intermediate fact was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, and the charge of negligent driving causing death failed.

Orders Made

  • Verdict of not guilty of negligent driving causing death.

Key Takeaways

  • Intermediate facts in inferential criminal cases must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Where the Crown's case depended on an inference from circumstantial evidence, and a particular factual finding was an indispensable link in the reasoning chain, the District Court confirmed that finding must itself be established to the criminal standard, not merely on the balance of probabilities.

  • A prosecution relying on circumstantial evidence must exclude competing rational inferences. It was not enough for the Crown's version of events to be plausible or even more likely than alternatives. Where another inference was reasonably open on the evidence, the criminal standard was not met, and the decision provided a clear illustration of that principle in the context of a road fatality.

  • Statements made by the accused at the scene, while in shock, carried significant weight. The District Court accepted that those statements were consistent with all other evidence and contributed to the availability of a competing inference, particularly where there was no reason to reject the account and it aligned with the physical evidence.

  • Under s 168 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), a "back-up charge" referred from the Local Court is determined by the District Court judge sitting as if they were a magistrate. Newlinds SC DCJ relied on the same evidence tendered before the jury but conducted a separate analysis reflecting the different legal standard (negligence rather than dangerousness).

  • No sufficient evidence established the pedestrian's movements immediately before the collision, which proved fatal to the prosecution's case. The evidentiary record was insufficient to exclude alternative explanations to the criminal standard, as the inference the Crown sought was not the only one reasonably available.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation:
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 52A(1)(c)
- Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), ss 133, 168
- Roads and Transport Act 2013 (NSW), s 117

Cases:
- Derrick v Cheung [2001] HCA 48; (2001) 181 ALR 301
- DPP (NSW) v Yeo (2008) 51 MVR 157
- Hawthorne v Hillcoat [2008] NSWCA 340
- R v Fong [2020] NSWDC 214
- Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378
- Swan v The Queen [2020] HCA 11