Citation: [2026] NSWSC 287
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 31 March 2026
Judge(s): Campbell J
Background
This decision concerns the sentencing of an offender convicted by jury of the murder of a man referred to in the judgment as the deceased. The offender and the deceased were both approximately 52 years old at the time of the offence and had known each other since their teenage years, having been close friends at various stages of their lives. They had renewed their acquaintance approximately one month before the killing, when the deceased moved back to the Illawarra area and was permitted by the offender and his de facto partner to park his caravan at their premises temporarily.
On 18 December 2022, tensions between the parties escalated. The deceased had earlier that day been charged with a drink-driving offence and, after being released from the police station, was unable to locate his vehicle. He formed a suspicion — without any evidentiary basis — that the offender was responsible for its disappearance. The deceased attended the offender's de facto partner's premises at Turner Esplanade, East Corrimal, accompanied by an acquaintance. A confrontation ensued that escalated from a verbal altercation into pushing, shoving, and attempts to exchange punches. In the course of the confrontation, the offender inflicted a single stab wound with a large kitchen knife above the deceased's right collar bone, rupturing the subclavian artery. The deceased died from rapid blood loss.
At trial, the offender did not dispute that he had stabbed the deceased or that he had the intent to at least injure him. The central issue at trial was self-defence. The jury was also asked to consider the partial defences of excessive self-defence and extreme provocation, either of which would have reduced the verdict to manslaughter. The jury rejected all three defences and returned a verdict of guilty of murder. The sentencing remarks address the assessment of facts for sentencing purposes, the objective gravity of the offence, and the offender's subjective circumstances, including his mental and physical health history and childhood deprivation.
Legal Issues
- Fact-finding for sentencing purposes: What factual findings could the sentencing judge make consistently with the jury's verdict, given the jury had rejected self-defence, excessive self-defence and extreme provocation?
- Objective gravity of the offence: How serious was this offence of murder, assessed against the maximum penalty of life imprisonment and the standard non-parole period of 20 years?
- Subjective factors: What weight should be given to the offender's history of mental and physical illness and his background of childhood deprivation?
- Special circumstances: Were there special circumstances justifying a departure from the statutory ratio between the non-parole period and the total sentence?
- Proportionality: What sentence was appropriate and proportionate to the gravity of the crime in light of both objective and subjective circumstances?
Decision
Campbell J began by articulating the well-established principles governing judicial fact-finding at sentencing following a jury trial. His Honour emphasised that while the sentencing judge must make independent findings of fact from the evidence, those findings must be consistent with the jury's verdict. The verdict of guilty of murder — rather than manslaughter — necessarily meant the jury was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Crown had negatived self-defence, excessive self-defence and extreme provocation. These conclusions operated as constraints on the sentencing judge's fact-finding.
His Honour made detailed factual findings about the circumstances of the offending. The wound itself was a single stab wound that did not necessarily require much force, but its anatomical location above the right collar bone caused it to rupture the subclavian artery, leading to rapid and fatal blood loss. Campbell J noted that the deceased had attended the premises carrying a bottle containing a substance akin to two-stroke fuel — an inflammable liquid — which was relevant context, though the significance of this finding in the broader sentencing exercise depends on the remainder of the remarks (which were truncated in the available text).
Campbell J gave careful consideration to the offender's subjective circumstances. The offender had a history of mental and physical illness and had experienced childhood deprivation. Applying the principles from Bugmy v The Queen, his Honour recognised that a background of severe deprivation does not diminish as a mitigating factor over time. These matters were relevant both to the offender's moral culpability and to the finding of special circumstances. His Honour found that special circumstances existed justifying a departure from the standard statutory ratio between the non-parole period and the balance of the sentence, to allow for an extended period of supervised release.
The reasoning (to the extent available in the truncated text) reflects a careful balancing of the competing sentencing purposes of retribution, deterrence, community protection and rehabilitation, with the maximum penalty of life imprisonment and the 20-year standard non-parole period serving as important guideposts rather than determinative benchmarks, consistent with the High Court's approach in Muldrock v The Queen.
Orders Made
- The offender was convicted of murder and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. (Note: the precise sentence imposed is not available in the truncated text provided.)
- A finding of special circumstances was made, permitting a departure from the standard statutory ratio between the non-parole period and the total sentence.
Caveat: Because the full text of the sentencing remarks was not available, the specific term of imprisonment and non-parole period cannot be confirmed from the material reviewed.
Key Takeaways
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Fact-finding at sentencing must be consistent with the jury's verdict. Where a jury rejected self-defence, excessive self-defence, and extreme provocation, the Supreme Court held that the sentencing judge could not make findings that would effectively reinstate those defences, even partially. Campbell J nonetheless confirmed that the sentencing judge retains an independent fact-finding role on matters relevant to culpability.
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Consistent with Muldrock, the standard non-parole period serves as a guidepost, not a starting point. Campbell J treated the 20-year standard non-parole period for murder as an important reference point to be considered alongside all relevant factors, rather than as a presumptive sentence from which adjustments are made.
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Following Bugmy v The Queen, childhood deprivation remains a relevant mitigating factor regardless of the passage of time. The Supreme Court gave weight to the offender's background of deprivation in assessing moral culpability and in determining whether special circumstances existed.
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A single stab wound, even one inflicted without necessarily great force, sustained a murder conviction where the requisite intent was established and defences were negated. The anatomical consequences of the wound, rather than the force used, were determinative of the fatal outcome.
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Special circumstances were found on the basis of the offender's personal history, including mental and physical illness and childhood deprivation. This finding justified a departure from the statutory ratio, allowing a longer period of supervised parole to support reintegration into the community.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation:
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 19A (maximum penalty for murder)
- Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 21, 54A, 61
- Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW)
Cases:
- Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39
- Veen v The Queen [No 2] (1988) 164 CLR 465
- R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374
- Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37
- Jonson v R [2016] NSWCCA 286
- Gore v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 330; (2010) 208 A Crim R 353