R v Repin [2026] NSWSC 68

Citation: [2026] NSWSC 68
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 13 February 2026
Judge(s): Hamill J

Background

The offender, Alexander Repin, was sentenced for the murder of Rex Graham Upton, an 89-year-old man who was approximately one month away from his 90th birthday at the time of his death. The offender had been released from custody on 26 September 2023 and, being homeless, had begun squatting in a condemned two-storey house in Keen Street, Lismore, owned by the deceased. The house had been declared uninhabitable following the Lismore floods of early 2022.

On 30 September 2023, Mr Upton attended the property while a gardener, Michael Woods, was performing maintenance. After hearing noises from inside the house and seeing movement on the rear balcony, Mr Upton walked upstairs and confronted the offender, asking what he was doing in the condemned premises. A violent and spontaneous assault ensued. The offender punched the elderly man and kicked him in the head while he lay helpless on the ground. Mr Woods witnessed the kick and attempted to go upstairs, at which point the offender brandished a large kitchen knife, forcing Mr Woods to retreat. The offender was arrested nearby shortly afterwards, with blood on his hands and shoes and a large kitchen knife concealed in his clothing.

Mr Upton suffered bilateral subdural haematomas, orbital fractures, multiple lacerations, and other serious injuries. He never regained consciousness and was pronounced dead on 7 October 2023 after life support was withdrawn. The direct cause of death was blunt force head injuries. Mr Repin was convicted of murder (on the basis of an intention to cause grievous bodily harm rather than an intention to kill) and a further offence of being armed with intent to commit an intimidation offence, the latter arising from his brandishing of the knife at Mr Woods.

Legal Issues

What was the objective seriousness of the murder, assessed against the standard non-parole period of 20 years and the maximum penalty of life imprisonment?
What weight should be given to the vulnerability of the victim due to his advanced age?
Whether the offender's extensive criminal history, while not increasing the objective seriousness of the murder, warranted greater emphasis on personal deterrence and community protection?
Whether the offender's complex psychiatric, neurological, and cognitive difficulties reduced his moral culpability, and to what degree?
Whether the offender's history of family and childhood dysfunction was sufficient to establish a reduction in moral culpability, applying the principles in Bugmy v The Queen?
What role self-induced intoxication from drugs and alcohol played in the sentencing assessment, and whether it could operate as a mitigating factor?
How the offence of armed with intent to commit an intimidation offence (taken into account on sentence) should influence the overall sentence?
The application of the sanctity of human life principle and the impact of the homicide on the victim's family and the broader community.

Decision

Objective seriousness and the nature of the offence

Hamill J assessed the murder as falling below the mid-range of objective seriousness but declined to characterise it as "well below" that range. His Honour noted several factors pointing to reduced seriousness: the assault was spontaneous and unplanned, the offender did not intend to kill, the attack occurred over a very short period, and the offender did not use the knife against the deceased. However, the vulnerability of the victim — a man approaching 90 years of age — and the brutality and senselessness of the killing were significant countervailing factors. The Court also emphasised that the deceased was killed in his own property, a place where he was entitled to investigate without fear of violence. The statutory aggravating factor under s 21A(2)(eb) (offence committed in a victim's home) did not technically apply because the house was uninhabitable and Mr Upton was not living there, but Hamill J observed that this merely illustrated the limitations of a "checkbox" approach to aggravating features.

Criminal history and the additional offence

The offender's criminal record was described as "appalling," spanning from about 1990 (when he was approximately 15 or 16) through to 2022, and including convictions for violence, intimidation, and other offences. While the criminal history did not increase the objective seriousness of the murder itself, it was highly relevant to sentencing, particularly in relation to personal deterrence and the assessment of rehabilitation prospects. The separate offence of being armed with intent was taken into account on sentence without a separate penalty, but it required the Court to give greater weight to specific deterrence and rehabilitation considerations.

Mental health, background disadvantage, and moral culpability

The Court considered the offender's complex psychiatric, neurological, and cognitive difficulties. Hamill J found that these mental health issues justified a "modest reduction" in the offender's moral culpability. However, his Honour was careful to distinguish this from the offender's history of family and childhood dysfunction, which was found to be insufficient, on its own, to establish a reduction in culpability under the Bugmy framework. Critically, the Court found that the primary cause of the offending was self-induced intoxication from drugs and alcohol. Applying established authority, this was not treated as a mitigating factor. While the Court acknowledged the difficulty of disentangling the offender's long-term drug problem from his mental health issues, drug and alcohol consumption did not reduce the sentence.

Impact on family and community

Hamill J gave detailed and sympathetic attention to the victim impact evidence, describing the devastating effect of the murder on Mr Upton's adult children and wider family. The Court accepted the Crown's submission that the pain and suffering caused by the offence was heartfelt, long-lasting, and constituted a substantial aspect of the harm done to the community. The principle of the sanctity of human life was emphasised as a central consideration.

Orders Made

The offender was sentenced for murder, with the offence of armed with intent to commit an intimidation offence taken into account on the sentence for murder (no separate penalty imposed for the latter).
The precise term of imprisonment and non-parole period are not set out in the truncated portion of the judgment available for this summary. Based on the Court's reasoning, the sentence reflected a below-mid-range assessment of objective seriousness, tempered by the offender's extensive criminal history, the modest reduction for mental health considerations, and the significant weight given to personal deterrence, community protection, and the sanctity of human life.

Note: Because the full text of the judgment was not available, the specific sentence imposed cannot be confirmed.

Key Takeaways

The Supreme Court treated the advanced age and vulnerability of the elderly victim as a significant sentencing factor, holding that it substantially influenced the sentence even where the offence was assessed as below mid-range in objective seriousness.
Self-induced intoxication through voluntary consumption of drugs and alcohol remained a non-mitigating factor, even where the offender had complex, overlapping mental health and substance abuse issues. Drug-related cognitive impairment was not treated as equivalent to conditions that might independently reduce moral culpability.
A clear distinction was drawn between genuine psychiatric, neurological, and cognitive difficulties (which warranted a modest reduction in sentence) and background disadvantage or childhood dysfunction, which without more did not satisfy the Bugmy threshold for reduced culpability. Each strand of mental health and background evidence was separately delineated in determining its sentencing relevance.
Where the statutory aggravating factor under s 21A(2)(eb) did not technically apply, Hamill J observed that this did not diminish the real seriousness of the offence, confirming that statutory aggravating factors are not exhaustive and that a court assesses the true nature and circumstances of offending holistically.
The offender's extensive criminal history, particularly for violence, did not formally elevate the objective seriousness of the index offence but drove greater emphasis on personal deterrence and community protection in determining the appropriate sentence.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation:
- Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 3A, 21A, 21A(2)(eb), 21A(2)(j), 21A(2)(l), 21A(3)(i), 21A(5AA), 25D(2)(a), 28(2), 44(2),