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District Court 5 March 2026

R v Casserly

[2026] NSWDC 33

Sexual offences
SENTENCING CHILD SEXUAL ASSAULT

Citation: R v Casserly [2026] NSWDC 33
Court: District Court of New South Wales
Date: 5 March 2026
Judge(s): Abadee DCJ

Background

The offender, a 35-year-old man, was found guilty by jury on 15 December 2025 of one count of aggravated sexual assault contrary to s 61J(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The circumstance of aggravation was that the victim was under 16 years of age — she was 13 at the time of the offence.

The offence occurred on 24 January 2023 at Cardiff, in the home of the victim's father, where the victim was staying overnight. The offender was a long-standing friend of the victim's father and was well known to the victim, who described him as an uncle-like figure whom she trusted. On the evening in question, the victim had taken the offender's mobile phone to her bedroom to help him set up a streaming service. While in the bedroom, the offender made sexual overtures, which the victim verbally refused. When she attempted to leave the room, the offender blocked her path, physically moved her onto the bed, and committed penile-vaginal intercourse against her expressed wishes and physical resistance. DNA evidence on the victim's underwear was consistent with the offender being the major contributor.

The sentencing proceedings required Abadee DCJ to assess the objective seriousness of the offending, consider statutory aggravating factors, and evaluate the offender's subjective circumstances — including evidence of intellectual disability, possible developmental disorders, and a background of deprivation potentially engaging the principles from Bugmy v The Queen and DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa.

  • What was the objective seriousness of the offending, assessed against the standard non-parole period of 10 years and the maximum penalty of 20 years?
  • What statutory aggravating factors applied (including abuse of trust and offending in the victim's home)?
  • To what extent did the offender's intellectual disability and likely developmental disorders affect moral culpability and the assessment of sentence?
  • Whether and to what extent the Bugmy and De La Rosa principles — concerning the sentencing relevance of an offender's background of deprivation — were engaged on the evidence?
  • What was the appropriate sentence, having regard to all purposes of sentencing under s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)?

Decision

Objective seriousness: Abadee DCJ found that the offending was "naturally serious" but fell just below the mid-range of objective seriousness for offences of this kind. His Honour took into account that the offence was opportunistic rather than premeditated, was of relatively brief duration, and did not involve serious physical injury. However, several features increased its gravity: the significant age differential (22 years), the offender's ejaculation on or near the victim's vagina without protection, his persistence in the face of verbal and physical resistance, his blocking the victim's means of escape, and the use of some force in pushing her onto the bed and rolling her over.

Statutory aggravating factors: Two statutory aggravating factors were identified. First, the offending took place in the victim's father's home — a place the victim was entitled to treat as a sanctuary. Second, the offending involved an abuse of trust, given the offender's long-standing relationship with the family and his uncle-like status in the victim's life. The victim impact statement, read at the sentencing hearing, detailed severe disruption to the victim's childhood, relationship breakdowns, and tragically, suicide attempts.

Intellectual disability and Bugmy/De La Rosa principles: The sentencing remarks engaged in a careful analysis of the offender's subjective circumstances. The evidence indicated that the offender had an intellectual disability and likely developmental disorders, which the court accepted on the evidence (which was uncontradicted). Abadee DCJ considered the well-established principles that intellectual disability may reduce moral culpability and affect the weight to be given to general deterrence. His Honour also considered whether the Bugmy and De La Rosa principles — which recognise that a background of profound deprivation may reduce moral culpability and diminish the utility of punishment as a deterrent — were engaged on the facts. The court's analysis drew on recent appellate guidance in DG v R [2025] NSWCCA 137, Oliver v R [2025] NSWCCA 227, and EG v R [2015] NSWCCA 21. However, His Honour was careful to note that the offender's actual knowledge that the victim did not consent — as found consistently with the jury's verdict — was present notwithstanding his intellectual limitations, and this remained a significant factor in the sentencing assessment.

Sentence: The text of the judgment as provided is truncated and does not include the final sentence imposed. It is therefore not possible to state the precise term of imprisonment, non-parole period, or any other specific orders with certainty from the material available.

Orders Made

  • The offender was convicted of aggravated sexual assault contrary to s 61J(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
  • A sentence of imprisonment was imposed (the specific term and non-parole period are not available from the truncated text).
  • The offender would be subject to registration obligations under the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW), s 2D.

Note: Because the judgment text was truncated, the precise orders — including the length of any custodial sentence and non-parole period — cannot be confirmed from the material provided.

Key Takeaways

  • The District Court illustrated the careful, case-specific approach required when assessing the sentencing relevance of an offender's intellectual disability. While such disability may reduce moral culpability and temper the weight given to general deterrence, Abadee DCJ held that it does not extinguish culpability, particularly where the offender had actual knowledge that the victim did not consent.

  • Application of the Bugmy/De La Rosa principles required the Court to scrutinise the evidence of deprivation and its causal link to offending, rather than applying those principles broadly. Sufficient evidence of the offender's background and its connection to the circumstances of the offence was necessary before weight could be given to those principles.

  • Even in the absence of premeditation, the offender's exploitation of the opportunity created by being alone with a child, combined with his persistence despite clear refusal, was treated as a significant aggravating feature in the assessment of objective seriousness.

  • Both abuse of trust and offending in the victim's home were identified as statutory aggravating factors, reinforcing their continuing prominence in child sexual assault sentencing.

  • Consistent with Muldrock v The Queen, the standard non-parole period of 10 years was treated as a guidepost within the instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing, rather than as a mandatory benchmark or starting point.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation:
- Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 3A, 5
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 61J
- Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW), s 2D

Cases:
- Hancock v R [2025] NSWCCA
- The Queen v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270
- R v Gavel [2014] NSWCCA 56
- Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571
- Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1
- Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120
- DG v R [2025] NSWCCA 137
- Oliver v R [2025] NSWCCA 227
- R v PGM (2008) 187 A Crim R 152
- EG v R [2015] NSWCCA 21